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Abstract. This paper presents a belief revision operator for legal systems that
considers time intervals. This model relates techniques about belief revision for-
malisms and time intervals with temporalised rules for legal systems. Our goal is to
formalise a temporalised belief base and corresponding timed derivation, together
with a proper revision operator. This operator may remove rules when needed or
adapt intervals of time when contradictory norms are added in the system.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
One peculiar feature of the law is that it necessarily takes the form of a dynamic nor-
mative system [22,21]. Despite the importance of norm-change mechanisms, the logical
investigation of legal dynamics was for long time underdeveloped. However, research is
rapidly evolving and recent contributions exist.
In the eighties a pioneering research effort was devoted by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson [4] to develop a logical model (AGM) for also modeling norm change.
As is well-known, the AGM framework distinguishes three types of change operation
over theories. Contraction is an operation that removes a specified sentence φ from a
given theory Γ (a logically closed set of sentences) in such a way that Γ is set aside in
favor of another theory Γ−φ which is a subset of Γ not containing φ . Expansion operation
adds a given sentence φ to Γ so that the resulting theory Γ+φ is the smallest logically
closed set that contains both Γ and φ . Revision operation adds φ to Γ but it is ensured
that the resulting theory Γ∗φ be consistent. Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson argued
that, when Γ is a code of legal norms, contraction corresponds to norm derogation (norm
removal) and revision to norm amendment. AGM framework has the advantage of being
very abstract, as it works with theories consisting of simple logical assertions. For this
reason, it can capture basic aspects of the dynamics of legal systems, such as the change
obligations and permissions [7,14].
Some research has been carried out to reframe AGM ideas within richer rule-based
logical systems [24,23]. However, also these attempts suffer from some drawbacks of
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standard AGM, among them the fact that the proposed frameworks fail to handle the tem-
poral aspects of norm change: indeed, legal norms are qualified by temporal properties,
such as the time when the norm comes into existence and belongs to the legal system,
the time when the norm is in force, the time when the norm produces legal effects, and
the time when the normative effects hold. Since all these properties can be relevant when
legal systems change, [14] argues that failing to consider the temporal aspects of legal
dynamics poses a serious limit to correctly model norm change in the law.
Unlike rich but complex frameworks such as the one of [14], this paper claims that
belief revision techniques—which are based on an abstract and elegant machinery—can
be reconciled with need to consider several temporal patterns of legal reasoning. In this
work we are thus interested in the formalisation of a belief revision operator applied to
an epistemic model that considers rules and time. We enrich a simple logic language with
an interval-based model of time, to represent validity and effectiveness of a norm. The
revision operator may remove rules when needed or adapt intervals of time when newer,
contradictory norms are introduced in the system.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows an example to motivate the
main ideas of our proposal. Section 3 proposes the notions of temporalised belief base
and temporalised derivation. Section 4 presents a norm revision operator based on tem-
poralised belief base. Section 5 reports on related work. Some conclusions end the paper.
2. Motivating Example
Let us first of all present a concrete example that will serve to motivate the main ideas of
our proposal.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following pieces of information regarding a legislative at-
tempt to ease tax pressure for people that have been unemployed.
• A citizen was unemployed from 1980 to 1985.
• If unemployed from 1980 to 1983, then a tax exemption applies from 1984 to 1986,
in order to increase individual savings.
• New authorities in government revoke tax exemption for years 1985 and 1986.
• Tax exemption reinstated for the year 1985 due to agreements with labor unions.
However, later on the legislators approved a new normative establishing that finally there
is no tax-exemption for all citizens for the years 1985 and 1986.
The previous situation seems to establish that, at the end, a tax exemption applies
only for year 1985 for a while, before being revoked.
3. Legal System as Temporalised Belief Base
The problem of representing temporal knowledge and temporal reasoning arises in many
disciplines, including Artificial Intelligence. A usual way to do this is to determine a
primitive to represent time, and its corresponding metric relations. There are in the litera-
ture two traditional approaches to reasoning with and about time: a point based approach,
as in [14], and an interval based approach as in [5,9]. In the first case, the emphasis is
put on instants of time (e.g., timestamps) and a relation of precedence among them. In
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the second case, time is represented as continuous sets of instants in which something
relevant occurs. These intervals are identified by the starting and ending instants of time.
In this work, time intervals (like in [6,9]) will be considered. This design decision
has been taken because it simplifies the construction of an revision operator which will
be introduced below. That is, following the semantics of the temporalised rules proposed
in [14] and explained in Section 3 (an adapted version), the revision operator in many
cases only consists in modifying the intervals to maintain the consistency.
Besides, different temporal dimensions will be taken into account. That is, as it is
mentioned in [14], in a normative system, norms have different temporal dimensions: the
time of validity of a norm (when the norm enters in the normative system) and the time
of effectiveness (when the norm can produce legal effects). Thus, if one wants to model
norm modifications, then normative systems must be modelled by more complicated
structures. In particular, a normative system is not just the set of norms valid in it, but it
should also consider the normative systems where the norms are effective.
3.1. Preliminaries and Notation
We will adopt a propositional language L with a complete set of boolean connectives:
¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔. Each formula in L will be denoted by lowercase Greek characters:
α,β ,δ , . . . ,ω . We will say that α is the complement of ¬α and vice versa. The char-
acters σ will be reserved to represent cut function for a change operator. We also use
a consequence operator, denoted Cn(·), that takes sets of sentences in L and produces
new sets of sentences. This operatorCn(·) satisfies inclusion (A⊆Cn(A)), idempotence
(Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A))), and monotony (if A ⊆ B then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B)). We will assume
that the consequence operator includes classical consequences and verifies the standard
properties of supraclassicality (if α can be derived from A by deduction in classical logic,
then α ∈ Cn(A)), deduction (β ∈ Cn(A∪ {α}) if and only if (α → β ) ∈ Cn(A)) and
compactness (if α ∈Cn(A) then α ∈Cn(A′) for some finite subset A′ of A). In general,
we will write α ∈ Cn(A) as A  α . Note that the AGM model [4] represents epistemic
states by means of belief sets, that is, sets of sentences closed under logical consequence.
Other models use belief bases; i.e., arbitrary sets of sentences [10,18]. Our epistemic
model is based on an adapted version of belief bases which have additional information
(time intervals). The use of belief bases makes the representation of the legal system state
more natural and computationally tractable. That is, following [20] (page 24), we con-
sider that legal systems sentences could be represented by a limited number of sentences
that correspond to the explicit beliefs of the legal system.
3.2. Time Interval
We will consider a universal finite set of time labels T= {t1, . . . , tn} strictly ordered; each
time label will represent an unique time instant. Simplifying the notation, we assume that
ti − 1 is the immediately previous instant to the instant ti and ti + 1 is the immediately
posterior instant to the instant ti.
Like in [16] we propose temporalised literals, however, we use intervals. We will
consider an interval like finite ordered sequence of time labels ti, . . . , t j where i, j are
natural numbers (i ≤ j) and ti, . . . t j ∈ T denoting instances of time or timepoints. Thus
we have expressions of the type α interval , where interval can be as follow:
L.H. Tamargo et al. / Temporalised Belief Revision in the Law 51
• [ti, ti]: meaning that α holds at time ti. Following [14] α is transient (holding at
precisely one instant of time). For simplicity [ti, ti] = [ti].
• [ti,∞]: meaning that α holds from ti. Following [14] α is persistent from ti.
• [ti, t j]: meaning that α holds from time ti to t j with ti < t j.
Then we will consider a set of time intervals Iwhich contains intervals as those described
previously. Thus, for simplicity, we can have expressions like αJ where J ∈ I. Intervals
in I will be denoted by uppercase Latin characters: A,B,C, . . . ,Z. Two intervals may not
be disjoint, as defined next.
Definition 1. Contained interval. Let R,S∈ I be two intervals. We say that R is contained
in S, denoted R⊆ S if and only if for all ti ∈ R it holds that ti ∈ S.
Definition 2. Overlapped interval. Let R,S ∈ I be two intervals. We say that R and S are
overlapped, denoted R≈ S if and only if there exists ti ∈ R such that ti ∈ S.
EXAMPLE 2. Let R,S,V ∈ I where R = [t3, t7], S = [t4, t6] and V = [t5, t9] with
t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t9 ∈ T. Then S⊆ R, R≈V and S≈V.
3.3. Temporalised Belief Base
As rules are part of the knowledge, they are subject of temporal validity too: the time of
force of a rule, i.e., the time when a rule can be used to derive a conclusion given a set of
premises. In this perspective we can have expressions like
(α [ta,tb] → β [tc,td ])[te,t f ]
meaning that the rule is in force from timepoint te to t f , or in other words, we can use
the rule to derive the conclusion at time from time te to t f . The full semantics of this
expression is that from time te to t f we can derive that β holds from time tc to td if we
can prove that α holds from time ta to tb. But now we are doing a derivation from time te
to t f , so the conclusion β [tc,td ] is derived from time te to t f and the premise α [ta,tb] must be
derived from time te to t f as well. In the same way a conclusion can persist, this applies
as well to rules and then to derivations.
Thus, it is possible to define temporalised belief base which will contain tempo-
ralised literal and temporalised rules (see Example 3). This base represents a legal sys-
tem in which each temporalised sentence defines a norm whose time interval determines
the validity and effectiveness time.
EXAMPLE 3. A legal system can be represented by the temporalised belief base K =
{α [t1,t3],α [t4],(α [t1,t4] → β [t4,t6])[t4,t6],β [t5,t6],β [t6,t8],β [t10],δ [t11],(δ [t11] → β [t15,t20])[t5,t6],
ω [t2,t8],(ω [t4] → β [t6,∞])[t21,t22],ε [t1,∞]}.
This type of belief base representation implies that a sentence can appear more than
once in a temporalised belief base; but from the point of view of the temporalised sen-
tences stored in the temporalised belief base there is no redundancy because each tempo-
ralised sentence has different time interval. For instance, consider Example 3, α appears
two times, but with different intervals. In this case, we will say that α is intermittent and
it means that α is held from t1 to t3 and it is held in the instant t4. Besides, if the intervals
of a sentence are overlapped (β [t5,t6], β [t6,t8] in Example 3), despite that the time inter-
val of the sentence intuitively be only one ([t5, t8]), we decided to maintain all versions
because will be more suitable when we will model the dynamics of the legal system.
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3.4. Temporalised Derivation
Note that a norm can explicitly be in a temporalised belief base, α [t5] ∈ K in Exam-
ple 3. However, a norm can implicitly be represented in a temporal belief base if some
conditions are held. For instance, in Example 3, β is implicitly represented with ω [t2,t8],
(ω [t4] → β [t6,∞])[t21,t22] due to the antecedent of the rule is held in t4 by the temporalised
sentence ω [t2,t8]. Next, temporalised derivation for a sentence are defined to capture this
notion. To do this, first we define a temporalised derivation in a time instant and then we
give a definition of temporalised derivation in time interval. The last mentioned is based
on the previous.
Definition 3. Temporalised derivation in a time instant. Let K be a set of temporalised
sentences and α [ti] be a temporalised sentence. We say that α [ti] is derived from K (de-
noted K t α [ti]) if and only if:
• αJ ∈K and ti ∈ J, or
• (βH → αP)Q ∈K and ti ∈ P and K t β [t j ] for all t j ∈ H.
Definition 4. Temporalised derivation in a time interval. Let K be a set of temporalised
sentences and α [ti,t j ] be a temporalised sentence. We say that α [ti,t j ] is derived from K
(denoted K t α [ti,t j ]) if and only if K t α [tp] for all tp ∈ [ti, t j].
To compute the temporalised derivation of a sentence checking each instant of the
intervals benefits us in special cases where implicit sentences need temporalised sen-
tences with overlapped intervals as antecedents. To determine the time interval of the
implicitly derived temporal sentence, the temporal consequence will be defined below.
Definition 5. Temporalised consequence. Let K be a set of temporalised sentences and
α [ti,t j ] be a temporalised sentence. We say that α [ti,t j ] is a temporalised consequence of
K (α [ti,t j ] ∈Cnt(K)) if and only if K t α [ti,t j ].
EXAMPLE 4. Consider again the temporalised belief base of Example 3. Then, K t
β [t4,∞], that is, β [t4,∞] ∈Cnt(K); and K t α [t1,t4], that is, α [t1,t4] ∈Cnt(K).
Note that the underlying semantics of this type of derivation (legal system) differs
from that in propositional logic when we want to represent the knowledge [9]. Note that,
following Definition 4, the interval of an implicitly derived sentence will be the inter-
val of the consequent of the rule that derives the conclusion of the proof. For instance,
suppose that K= {γ [t2,t5],(γ [t3,t4] → ε [t6,t9])[t1,∞]} then the time interval of ε is [t6, t9].
In this proposal, a contradiction arise when two complementary sentences can be
derived with time intervals overlapped. For instance, suppose K = {α [t2,t9],¬α [t1,t3]},
in this case there exist a contradiction. However, consider K = {α [t5],¬α [t1,t3]}, in this
case, we will say that K does not have contradictions. Moreover, we will say that a
temporalised belief base is temporally consistent if the base does not have contradictions.
The temporalised belief base of Example 3 is temporally consistent.
4. Legal Belief Revision
A legal system should be temporally consistent, i.e., it cannot contain contradictory
norms at any time. Hence, we propose a norm prioritised revision operator that allows
to consistently add a temporalised sentence α [ti,t j ] to a consistent legal system K.
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This special revision operator is inspired in the rule semantics explained above in
Section 3 (an adapted version from that proposed in [14]). Thus, following the concept
of consistency proposed in Section 3, the revision operator may remove temporalised
sentences or, in some cases, may only modify the intervals to maintain consistency.
To incorporate a norm ¬β J into a legal system, it is necessary to consider all possible
contradictions that may arise if the norm is added without checking for consistency.
For this, it is necessary to compute all proofs of β considering only those temporalised
sentences βP whose effectiveness time is overlapped with the time interval J, that is,
J ≈ P. Note that, computing all minimal proofs of a temporal sentence considering only
those which time interval is overlapped with the time interval of the input sentence, is an
optimized version. Next, a set of minimal proof for a sentence will be defined.
Definition 6. LetK be a temporalised belief base and αJ a temporalised sentence. Then,
H is a minimal proof of αJ if and only if
1. H⊆K,
2. αP ∈Cnt(H) with J ≈ P, and
3. if H′ ⊂H, then αP ∈Cnt(H′) with J ≈ P.
Given a temporalised sentence αJ, the function Π(αJ ,K) returns the set of all the mini-
mal proofs for αJ from K.
REMARK 1. Each set of Π(αJ ,K) derives α in at least one time instant of J.
EXAMPLE 5. Consider the temporalised belief base of Example 3. Then Π(β [t5,t6],K)
= {H1,H2,H3,H4} where:
• H1 = {α [t1,t3],α [t4],(α [t1,t4] → β [t4,t6])[t4,t6]},
• H2 = {β [t5,t6]},
• H3 = {β [t6,t8]},
• H4 = {ω [t2,t8],(ω [t4] → β [t6,∞])[t21,t22]}
Note thatH1 is minimal due to α should be derived from t1 to t4 to use the rule (α [t1,t4] →
β [t4,t6])[t4,t6] hence, α [t1,t3] and α [t4] should be in H1.
Our operator is based on a selection of sentences in the knowledge base that are
relevant to derive the sentence to be retracted or modified. In order to perform a revision,
following kernel contractions [19], this approach uses incision functions, which select
from the minimal subsets entailing the piece of information to be revoked or modified.
We adapt this notion of incision function proposed in [19] to our epistemic model. An
incision function only selects sentences that can be relevant for α and at least one element
from each Π(αJ ,K), as follows.
Definition 7. Incision function. LetK be a temporalised belief base, an incision function
σ for K is a function such that for all αJ ∈Cnt(K):
• σ(Π(αJ ,K))⊆⋃(Π(αJ ,K)).
• For each H ∈Π(αJ ,K), H∩σ(Π(αJ ,K)) = /0.
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In Hansson’s work it is not specified how the incision function selects the sentences
that will be discarded of each minimal proof. In our approach, this will be solved by
considering those sentences that can produce legal effects in favour of a possible contra-
diction with the new norm. Thus, if the new norm is ¬β J then the incision function will
select the temporalised sentences βP or (αQ → βF)H of each Π(β J ,K).
Definition 8. Search consequence function. Sc: L × K → K, is a function such that for
a given sentence α and a given temporalised base K with H⊆K,
Sc(α,H) = {αJ : αJ ∈H} ∪{(βP → αQ)R : (βP → αQ)R ∈H and β ∈ L}
Definition 9. Consequence incision function. Given a set of minimal proofs Π(αJ ,K),
σ cis a consequence incision function if it is a incision function for K such that




EXAMPLE 6. Consider Examples 3 and 5. Then, Sc(β ,H1) = {(α [t1,t4] → β [t4,t6])[t4,t6]},
Sc(β ,H2) = {β [t5,t6]}, Sc(β ,H3) = {β [t6,t8]}, and Sc(β ,H4) = {(ω [t4] → β [t6,∞])[t21,t22]}.
Thus, σ c(β [t5,t6],K) =
⋃
H∈Π(β [t5,t6],K) Sc(β ,H) = {(α [t1,t4] → β [t4,t6])[t4,t6], β [t5,t6], β [t6,t8],
(ω [t4] → β [t6,∞])[t21,t22]}
As mentioned before, the revision operator may remove temporalised sentences or,
in some cases, may modify the intervals to maintain consistency. Next, a temporal pro-
jection will be defined based on a given time interval. The idea here is, given a tempo-
ralised belief base K and given a time interval [ti, t j], to return a temporalised belief base
K
′ containing those sentences from K whose time intervals be out of [ti, t j].
Definition 10. Excluding temporal projection. Let K be a temporalised belief base and
let [ti, t j] be a time interval where ti, t j ∈ T. A excluding temporal projection of K from ti









t j will contain:
• α [tp,ti−1] if tp < ti, tq ≥ ti and tq ≤ t j.
• α [t j+1,tq] if tp ≥ ti, tq > t j and tp ≤ t j.
• α [tp,ti−1] and α [t j+1,tq] if tp < ti, tq > t j.
• α [tp,tq] if tq < ti or tp > t j.
REMARK 2. Note that the case in which tp ≥ ti and tq ≤ t j the temporal sentence it is
not considered. In this case, this sentence is erased.
EXAMPLE 7. Consider Example 6 and suppose that S is a temporalised belief base and
S= σ c(β [t5,t6],K). Then,
out
St5t6 = {(α [t1,t4] → β [t4])[t4,t6], β [t7,t8], (ω [t4] → β [t7,∞])[t21,t22]}.
Following the notion of excluding temporal projection (Definition 10) a norm pri-
oritized revision operator can be defined. That is, an operator that allows to consistently
add temporalised sentences in a temporalised belief base. If a contradiction arises, then
the revision operator may remove temporalised sentences or modify the corresponding
intervals in order to maintain consistency.
L.H. Tamargo et al. / Temporalised Belief Revision in the Law 55
Definition 11. Let K be a temporalised belief base and α [ti,t j ] be a temporalised sen-
tence. The operator “ ⊗”, called prioritized revision operator, is defined as follow:
K⊗α [ti,t j ] = (K\S)∪
out
Stit j ∪ {α [ti,t j ]}
where S= σ c(¬α [ti,t j ],K)
EXAMPLE 8. Consider Example 3 and suppose that a new norm ¬β [t5,t6] it is wished to
add. To do this, it is necessary to doK⊗¬β [t5,t6]. Consider Examples 5 and 6. Then,K⊗
¬β [t5,t6] = {α [t1,t3], α [t4], (α [t1,t4] → β [t4])[t4,t6], β [t7,t8], β [t10], δ [t11], (δ [t11] → β [t15,t20])[t5,t6],
ω [t2,t8], (ω [t4] → β [t7,∞])[t21,t22], ε [t1,∞], ¬β [t5,t6]}. Note that, this new temporalised base is
temporally consistent.
The following example shows how our operator works in a particular situation when
a legal system undergoes many changes and has rules that complement each other.
EXAMPLE 9. Consider following temporalised belief base K = {β [t1,t10],(β [t1,t5] →
α [t1,t5])[t1,∞],(β [t6,t10] → α [t6,t10])[t1,∞],δ [t4]}. Note that, K t α [t1,t10] because K t α [ti]
for all ti ∈ [t1, t10]. Suppose that it is necessary to adopt ¬α [t1,t10]. To do this,
it is necessary to compute all the minimal proofs of α [t1,t10] in K. In this case,
Π(α [t1,t10],K) = {{β [t1,t10],(β [t1,t5] → α [t1,t5])[t1,∞],(β [t6,t10] → α [t6,t10])[t1,∞]}}. Then, S =
σ c(α [t1,t10],K) = {(β [t1,t5] →α [t1,t5])[t1,∞],(β [t6,t10] →α [t6,t10])[t1,∞]}. Thus,
out
St1t10= /0. There-
fore, K⊗¬α [t1,t10] = {β [t1,t10],δ [t4],¬α [t1,t10]}.
5. Related work
Alchourro´n and Makinson were the first to logically study the changes of a legal code
[2,3,1]. The addition of a new norm n causes an enlargement of the code, consisting
of the new norm plus all the regulations that can be derived from n. Alchourro´n and
Makinson distinguish two other types of change. When the new norm is incoherent with
the existing ones, we have an amendment of the code: in order to coherently add the new
regulation, we need to reject those norms that conflict with n. Finally, derogation is the
elimination of a norm n together with whatever part of the legal code that implies n.
[4] inspired by the works above proposed the so called AGM framework for belief
revision. This area proved to a very fertile one and the phenomenon of revision of logical
theories has been thoroughly investigated. It is then natural to ask if belief revision offers
a satisfactory framework for the problem of norm revision. Some of the AGM axioms
seem to be rational requirements in a legal context, whereas they have been criticised
when imposed on belief change operators. An example is the success postulate, requiring
that a new input must always be accepted in the belief set. It is reasonable to impose such
a requirement when we wish to enforce a new norm or obligation. However, it gives rise
to irrational behaviors when imposed to a belief set, as observed in [11].
The AGM operation of contraction is perhaps the most controversial one, due to
some postulates such as recovery [14,25], and to elusive nature of legal changes such as
derogations and repeals, which are all meant to contract legal effects but in remarkably
different ways [14]. Standard AGM framework is of little help here: it has the advantage
L.H. Tamargo et al. / Temporalised Belief Revision in the Law56
of being very abstract—it works with theories consisting of simple logical assertions—
but precisely for this reason it is more suitable to capture the dynamics of obligations
and permissions than the one of legal norms. In fact, it is hard in AGM to represent how
the same set of legal effects can be contracted in many different ways, depending on how
norms are changed. For this reason, previous works [12,13,14] proposed to combine a
rule-based system with some forms of temporal reasoning.
Difficulties behind standard AGM have been considered and some research has been
carried out to reframe AGM ideas within reasonably richer rule-based logical systems,
combining AGM ideas with Defeasible Logic [23,15] or Input/Output Logic [7,24].
[25] suggested a different route, i.e., employing in the law existing techniques—such
as iterated belief change, two-dimensional belief change, belief bases, and weakened
contraction—that can obviate problems identified in [14] for standard AGM.
In this paper we showed to extend base revision with temporal reasoning, and, in
particular, with time intervals. Our approach, like in [14], is able to deal with constituents
holding in an interval of time, thus an expression=⇒ a[t1,t2] meaning that a holds between
t1 and t2 can be seen as a shorthand of the pair of rules from [14] (defeasible and defeater)
=⇒ a[t1,pers] and  ¬a. We have taken this design decision because it simplifies the
construction of the revision operator: following the semantics of the temporalised rule
proposed in [14] and explained in Section 3 (an adapted version), the revision operator
in many cases only consists in modifying the intervals to maintain the consistency.
Interval and duration based temporal defeasible logic have been developed [6,17].
[17] focuses on duration and periodicity and relationships with various forms of causal-
ity. [6] proposed a sophisticated interaction of defeasible reasoning and standard tempo-
ral reasoning (i.e., mutual relationships of intervals and constraints on the combination
of intervals). In both cases it is not clear whether the techniques employed there are rel-
evant to the application to norm modifications, and such works consider only a single
temporal dimension.
In [8], belief revision in a temporal logic context is also addressed. However, they
use modal operators over possible worlds to model belief changes. Here we are focused
in a propositional language with time intervals following kernel contraction construction
proposed in [19].
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we have introduced a time-based belief revision operator for legal systems.
A temporalised belief base and a temporalised belief derivation was defined, following
the formalisation of temporal rules, suitable to model examples in the legal area. In this
special belief base each piece of information is decorated with a time interval. In this
scenario our novel belief revision operator allows the consistent addition of temporalised
sentences in a temporalised belief base. If a contradiction arises, then the revision oper-
ator may either remove conflictive temporalised sentences or modify the intervals.
Change operators are presented following the AGM model [4] where the operators
are defined through constructions and representation theorems. In this paper, the operator
was defined through construction. As future work, rationality postulates will be given and
its corresponding Representation Theorem for this new revision operator. This theorem
proves the correspondence between the set of postulates and the construction.
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